Related-party Transactions and Asymmetric Cost Behavior

• 발행기관: 한국자료분석학회
• 저자명: JungEun Cho
• 간행물 정보: 『Journal of The Korean Data Analysis Society (JKDAS)』Vol.21 No.1, 35~48쪽, 전체 14쪽
• 주제분류: 자연과학 > 통계학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2019.02.28

영문 초록

This study examines whether related-party transactions impact firms’ asymmetric cost behavior. The results show that firms with higher level of related-party transactions present greater cost stickiness. This suggests that information asymmetry between managers and outside stakeholders caused by related-party transactions triggers managers to maintain unutilized resources even when demand falls so that they can maximize their personal utility, resulting in cost asymmetry. Also, related-party transactions in firms with high proportion of largest shareholders’ ownership lead to greater cost stickiness. The results imply that as largest shareholders have incentive to transfer the wealth of minority shareholders to themselves, high level of related-party transactions in firms where the largest shareholders own a high proportion of the firms’ shares leads to greater cost stickiness. This paper contributes to the extant literature by providing additional evidence that related-party transactions which exacerbate agency problems may lead to cost stickiness.

목차

1. Introduction

2. Theoretical background and hypotheses

3. Research design and sample description

4. Empirical Results

5. Discussion

6. Summary and Conclusion

키워드

related-party transactions asymmetric cost behavior cost stickiness largest shareholders’ ownership.