산업내 기업간 경쟁이 투자효율성에 미치는 영향

• 영문명: The Effect of Industry-level Competition on Investment Efficiency
• 발행기관: 한국회계정보학회
• 저자명: 조정은 최아름
• 간행물 정보: 『한국회계정보학회 학술대회발표집』2015년 춘계학술대회 발표집, 1~35쪽, 전체 35쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 회계학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2015.05.18

국문 초록

기업이 속한 산업 내에서의 경쟁정도는 기업의 투자효율성에 영향을 미칠 수 있다. 경쟁의 긍정적인 측면에서 살펴보면, 경쟁은 외부지배구조로서의 역할을 수행하여 전문경영인의 대리인 문제를 완화시킴으로써 효율적 투자를 촉진시키는 역할을 할 수 있다. 그러나 그 반대로 경쟁은 다른 종류의 대리인 문제를 발생시켜 경영자의 과잉투자를 유발하거나 정보불균형을 심화시켜 투자의 효율성을 저해하는 부정적인 결과도 초래할 수 있다. 2002년부터 2011년까지의 국내 상장기업의 자료를 이용하여 이러한 예측에 대해 실증 분석한 결과 경쟁의 부정적 측면을 지지하는 결과를 얻었다. 즉 산업 내에서의 경쟁수준이 증가함에 따라 과잉투자가 늘어나는 현상이 발견되었다. 그러나 과소투자 정도는 산업내 기업간 경쟁의 영향을 받지 않았다. 이런 발견은 경쟁이 대리인 문제와 연결되어 부정적인 역할을 할 수 있다는 점을 제시함으로써 이해관계자들에게 경쟁의 역할에 대한 중요한 시사점을 제공해 주고 있다.

영문 초록

This study examines the effect of industry-level product market competition on investment efficiency of a firm. The level of competition can either increase or decrease the investment efficiency. First, the level of competition can increase investment efficiency. Competition plays an external governance mechanism which enforces managers to exercise their best efforts not to fall behind in the competition. The good governance mechanism results in better monitoring by outside stakeholders, which also discipline managers to work harder to satisfy the interest of outside shareholders. As a result, the investment efficiency could increase. We call this prediction as a favorable effect of competition. In contrast, intense competition may deter investment efficiency via three different channels. First, competition may play a role in accelerating the over-investment of mangers to win in the competition. Asymmetric bonus contract between managers and shareholders (such as overly generous bonus contract in the case of success but no or weak penalty in the case of failure) may induce managers to take an excessive risk - such as over-investment to pursue great success. Second, managers have an incentive to build their own empire. The incentive motivates managers to over-invest in order to increase the assets under the control of the managers. Third, under intense competition, managers may be reluctant to release important information to minimize proprietary costs which might incur when competitors get the information. As a result, the amount of available information decreases in the market, which incurs information asymmetry. As a result, inefficient investment could be made. We call this prediction as an unfavorable effect of competition. Note that among three different theories, the first and second reasons predict over-investments, while the last reason predicts both over- and under-investments. We test these predictions with 4,740 number of firm-year observations collected over the period from 2002 to 2011. To measure the investment efficiency empirically, we use the sophisticated method developed by Biddle et al.(2009). The method enables us to separate the two possible situations: one in which over-investment is likely to occur (when cash is abundant and/or leverage ratio is low) and the other in which under-investment is likely to occur (when cash is not abundant and/or leverage ratio is high). In each situation, the method compares the actual level of investment with predicted level of the investment. Before the development of this method by Biddle et al.(2009), studies in economics and finance areas mostly use naive comparisons between the actual level of investments across different firms and ex post firm performances. Compared with the methods used in prior studies, the method developed by Biddle et al.(2009) is an ex ante method to measure the investment efficiency. In this study, in addition to the original model developed by Biddle et al.(2009), we control for the three internal governance characteristics: the ratio of independent directors, the size of the board (i.e., the number of board members), and the existence of audit committee. The empirical findings support the unfavorable effect of competition. Specifically, we document that the tendency to over-invest increases for the firms that face intense market competition when firms are likely to over-invest. However, we fail to find any evidence that managers tend to under-invest for the firms that face intense market competition when firms are likely to under-invest. These findings suggest that investment efficiency drops as the level of competition increases. Further, among three theories that predict unfavorable effect of competition, the first and second theories are likely reasons for the documented association. These findings are robust to various sensitivity analyses.

목차

I. 서 론

II. 선행연구의 요약과 가설의 설정

III. 연구방법론

IV. 실증분석 결과

V. 추가 분석

VI. 결론

참고문헌

키워드

투자효율성 산업 내 경쟁 과잉(과소)투자 외부지배구조 Investment efficiency Industry-level competition Over- (Under-) Investment External governance mechanism.