Enactment of Restriction on Cross-Shareholding and Managerial Reactions

• 발행기관: 한국자료분석학회
• 저자명: Tae Hyuk Kim Wi Saeng Kim Sang Min Chung
• 간행물 정보: 『Journal of The Korean Data Analysis Society (JKDAS)』Vol.13 No.2, 567~579쪽, 전체 13쪽
• 주제분류: 자연과학 > 통계학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2011.04.30

영문 초록

This study empirically evaluates the controlling shareholders’ reaction to the enactment of the American pattern of corporate governance system. Government policy makers may intervene in the market for corporate control to improve on corporate governance. We try to examine whether corporate sectors follow the intent of the governance reforms act. The results show that fixed asset growth rate does not differ between firms that are restricted from cross-shareholding and firms that are not restricted. And fixed asset growth rate is positively associated with foreign investors’ equity holding. These findings suggest that government regulation did not affect the capital investment behavior for firms controlled by dominant shareholders. However we found that stock return performance is poorer for regulated firms than for unregulated firms. The result means that enactment produced any differences in new capital investment level between regulated firms and unregulated firms

목차

1. Introduction

2. Agency problems under pyramid and cross-ownership structure

2. Agency problems under pyramid and cross-ownership structure

4. Data Source and Test Results

5. Summary and Conclusion

References

키워드

Agency problem Capital investment Cross-Shareholding Governance Reforms Ownership Structure