The Ex Ante Optimal Unemployment Insurance

• 발행기관: 한국재정학회(구 한국재정·공공경제학회)
• 저자명: Chul-In Lee
• 간행물 정보: 『한국재정학회 학술대회 논문집』2009년도 추계학술대회 논문집, 1~30쪽, 전체 30쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 경제학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2009.11.30

영문 초록

The optimal unemployment insurance (UI) literature initiated by the seminal work of Baily (1978) focuses on unemployed workers’ moral hazard in job search conditional on “unemployment that has already occurred” – the ex post approach. In contrast, this study considers the optimal UI “before unemployment occurs” – the ex ante approach – by looking at moral hazard in work efforts of employed workers caused by generous benefits and the resulting firms’ endogenous employment adjustment. A notable advantage of taking this ex ante approach is that we can study the interaction between individuals and firms in response to UI benefit changes in a general equilibrium framework. New findings include: (i) labor supply elasticity is a central determinant of the optimal benefit level, more important than the risk aversion parameter; (ii) the optimal benefit level is also sensitive to the size of existing public expenditures; and (iii) the optimal level is lower than those in existing studies taking the ex post approach

목차

I. Introduction

II. The Model

III. Optimal Unemployment Benefits: quantitative analysis

VI. Summary and Conclusion

키워드

social insurance unemployment moral hazard ex ante optimality