An Empirical Test of Migration and Fiscal Externality

• 발행기관: 한국재정학회(구 한국재정·공공경제학회)
• 저자명: Tomoya Ida Mats Wilhelmsson
• 간행물 정보: 『한국재정학회 학술대회 논문집』2009년도 추계학술대회 논문집, 1~25쪽, 전체 25쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 경제학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2009.11.30

영문 초록

Tiebout hypothesis posits that residential sorting can lead to efficient provision of local public goods in a decentralized society. By contraries, literatures on tax competition find two types of tax externalities where different hierarchical government levels locally tax the same base: a horizontal tax externality working among governments of the same level would bring to tax rates that are too low compared to social optimum; but a vertical tax externality acting between different levels of governments would yield suboptimally high tax rates. This paper aims to empirically investigate the two contrary hypotheses about fiscal decentralization by using Swedish regional data during the period 2000- 2006. Consequently, our empirical results derive two conclusions. First, Tiebout’s argument appears to be valid only if there is some available housing on the market. Second, contrary to Brülhart and Jametti (2006, Journal of Public Economics 90, pp.2027-2067), a dominant horizontal tax externality would lower suboptimally municipal tax rates.

목차

1. Introduction

2. Discussion on Vote with the Feet

3. Theory of Tax Externality

4. Empirical Analysis

5. Conclusion

키워드

Fiscal federalism Vote with the feet Tax externality Housing market Swedish fiscal constitution