사이코패스의 형사책임능력

• 영문명: Psychopathy and Responsibility
• 발행기관: 한국형사법학회
• 저자명: 안성조(Ahn, Seong-Jo)
• 간행물 정보: 『형사법연구』형사법연구 제20권 제4호, 167~196쪽, 전체 30쪽
• 주제분류: 법학 > 법학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2008.01.27

영문 초록

Could psychopathy be a condition exculpating criminal liability? Our common-sense intuitions about psychopathy probably rest on figures such as Ted Bundy, the serial killer who performed acts of unspeakable cruelty, collectively torturing and murdering dozens of people. This kind of people is model of evil. Because their actions appear ‘rational', in the sense that they are aware of what they are doing and harbor no illusions about the nature or consequence of their conduct, such psychopaths are generally held to be criminally responsible for their actions and thus are punished by jail and even execution. Nevertheless, academics and jurists have repeatedly suggested that psychopaths should be excused from criminal liability for their actions on a variety of several theories. Fundamentally, they assert that the capacity to feel empathy toward others is a necessary part of how human beings make moral decisions and respond to morally relevant stimuli. In the absence of these emotional capacities, psychopaths are either less than fully rational or lack the requisite mental equipment to appreciate and act in conformity with conventional morality. Therefore, while steps may be taken to protect the public from psychopath's future dangerousness, they should not be regarded as fully moral agents for whom punishment is appropriate. These arguments are as follows. 1) Psychopaths are less than fully rational because they are unable to understand the moral worth of others, and the insanity defense is meant to except those with serious rationality failings(the Kantian argument); 2) Psychopaths, because of a biological deficiency in their ability to feel emotion, lack the necessary cognitive structures to feel the motivational force of moral norms(the first Humean argument: the biological motivational deficiency argument); 3) Psychopaths stand outside our practice of moral blame because they fail to appreciate the interpersonal nature of moral norms and their ‘immoral' acts do not express disrespect nor are an appropriate subject of the reactive attitudes that constitute our moral practice(the second Humean argument: the interpretivist moral practice argument)

목차

Ⅰ. 문제의 제기: 책임능력판단의 공정성

Ⅱ. 사이코패스의 특징과 발병 원인

Ⅲ. 사이코패스의 형사책임능력

Ⅳ. 맺음말

키워드

사이코패스 사이코패시 정신병질 치료가능성 책임능력 범죄충동 칸트적 논변 흄적 논변. 심신장애 치료감호법 Psychopath Psychopathy Curability Culpability Criminal Impulse Kantian Argument Humean Argument Condition negating Culpability Law of Cure and Custody