Political rents, elections, and in-kind transfers:Theory and empirical evidence

• 발행기관: 한국재정학회(구 한국재정·공공경제학회)
• 저자명: Dowon Kim ongwon Lee angwon Park
• 간행물 정보: 『한국재정학회 학술대회 논문집』2017년도 추계학술대회 논문집, 1~33쪽, 전체 33쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 경제학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2017.09.30

영문 초록

This study examines the claim that political rent-seeking promotes excessive in-kind transfers. Our analysis suggests that: (1) a government seeking political rents would substitute in-kind transfers for cash transfers and (2) this substitution effect is weakened at the end of the election term because the incumbent would shift the composition of transfers towards cash payments in order to secure reelection. Data taken from OECD countries for 25 years support the hypotheses. In particular, we find that the pre-electoral effect is more significant in established democracies where voters are well informed about electoral politics. The findings of this paper imply that the interactions between political rent-seeking and reelection constraints markedly influence the composition of social transfers.

목차

1. Introduction

2. Literature Review

3. Model

4. Empirical Evidence

5. Concluding remarks

키워드

in-kind transfer cash transfer olitical rents elections