The Evolution of Citizen Participation and Regulatory Success

• 발행기관: 한국재정학회(구 한국재정·공공경제학회)
• 저자명: Akao K Kim G
• 간행물 정보: 『한국재정학회 학술대회 논문집』2012년도 춘계학술대회 논문집, 552~564쪽, 전체 13쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 경제학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2012.03.30

영문 초록

In an evolutionary game setting in which three different types of player are randomly matched it is shown that a full compliance with an environmental regulation can be evolved as an asymptotically stable state, but this critically depends on the size of a defector’s additional payoff at no private monitoring to a cooperator’s payoff, relative to his expected fine from an enforcer’s monitoring. Also with enforcers’ willingness to monitor voluntarily affected by their relative population share to defectors’, it is warned that even though the regulatory agency is strong in its policy, the society could be stuck in the neighborhood of the initial state if defectors are already many and a little larger than enforcers.

목차

Abstract

1. Introduction

2. The Model

3. Equilibrium and Stability

4. Social Capital and Citizen Participation

4. Conclusion

Reference

키워드

Regulation Monitoring Citizen Participation Social Capital Evolutionary Game