Structural Estimation of Bargaining Power within the Family

• 발행기관: 한국재정학회(구 한국재정·공공경제학회)
• 저자명: Heonjae Song
• 간행물 정보: 『한국재정학회 학술대회 논문집』2012년도 춘계학술대회 논문집, 367~392쪽, 전체 26쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 경제학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2012.03.30

영문 초록

This paper extends the literature on intergenerational transfers between adult married children and their parents in two ways. First, for a given couple, both sets of parents enter the optimization problem. Second, I develop and estimate a model where amount of transfers to the husband’s (wife’s) parents is assumed to depend on the couple’s income, the husband’s parents’ income, the wife’s parent’s income, and the bargaining power of husband (wife) within the family. Arguably it is plausible that each spouse cares more about their parents than their in-laws, and thus such transfers are a form of semi-private consumption. The estimation of this model takes into account that the functional form of the transfer to one set of parents will change if the optimal transfer to the other set of parents is zero. I find that husbands and wives have equal bargaining power in South Korea.

목차

Abstract

1. Introduction

2. Basic Facts on Within-Family Transfers for South Korea

3. Economic Model of Transfers

4. Estimation Strategy

5. Data

6. Institutional Background of South Koreatttt

7. Estimation Results

8. Concluding remark

References