Economic Sanctions and Militarized Disputes

• 발행기관: 한국자료분석학회
• 저자명: Johann Park
• 간행물 정보: 『Journal of The Korean Data Analysis Society (JKDAS)』Vol.23 No.1, 61~74쪽, 전체 14쪽
• 주제분류: 자연과학 > 통계학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2021.02.28

영문 초록

How are economic sanctions and militarized disputes related? Sanctions are often thought of as a viable substitute for military force and feeble diplomacy. Sanctions, however, are also argued to be a prelude to war. Which perspective is right? This question is important to examine in that economic sanctions remain a main form of foreign policy states use in response to international political challenges in this post-Cold War era. This study explores the theoretical rationales for the two contrasting views. It then offers a comprehensive statistical test on the relationship between economic sanctions and militarized conflict. For the 1950-2005 period, this study compiles a binary time-series cross-sectional dataset mainly from the Threat and Imposition of Economic Sanctions project and the Correlates of War project. The statistical results reveal that economic sanctions increase the probability of interstate military conflict. In other words, when two states are involved in economic sanctions as the primary sender and target, they are more likely to militarize their disagreement.

목차

1. Introduction and Motivation

2. Hypotheses and Rationales

3. Research Design

4. Results

5. Conclusion

References

키워드

economic sanctions militarized disputes binary time-series cross-sectional analysis the correlates of war project the Threat and Imposition of Sanctions project