The Hope and the Frustration of the Korean South-North Relations 1973-74

• 발행기관: 한국외국어대학교 역사문화연구소
• 저자명: 노명환(Meung-Hoan Noh)
• 간행물 정보: 『역사문화연구』제26집, 339~366쪽, 전체 28쪽
• 주제분류: 인문학 > 역사학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2007.02.28

국문 초록

1973년 6월 23일 박정희 대통령은 북한에 남북한 동시 유엔가입과 공산권국가들에게 문호를 개방하는 내용을 골자로 하는 선언을 한다. 이는 6·23 선언으로 알려지게 되는데 독일의 동방정책 영향을 많이 받고 있다고 할 수 있다. 독일의 동방정책이 동독을 국가로 인정하는 국가들과 외교관계를 부정하는 할슈타인원칙을 폐기하고 동·서독의 동시 UN가입을 제안하고 실천했기 때문이다. 서독정부는 동방정책을 통해 화해와 접근을 통한 동독 및 동유럽 공산권 사회의 변화시킨다는 목표를 가지고 제반의 조약과 교류 및 협력 방안을 실현해 갔다. 6·23선언도 비슷한 목표를 가지고 발표된 것으로 알려졌으나 실제로 이는 1972년7·4 공동성명 이후 활발해진 북한의 외교관계 수립과 세계보건기구 가입 등에 대처하는 측면이 컸다. 따라서 이는 남북한 간의 냉전의 연장선상에 있었다고 볼 수 있다. 북한은 이러한 제안들을 화해를 위한 대화에 진지하게 임하기보다는 체제의 정당성을 선전하는 기회로 이용하는데 바빴다. 1973년 8월 김대중 납치사건, 1974년 8월 15일 문세광에 의한 박대통령 암살 미수사건 (육영수여사 저격), 같은 해 11월 북한군이 설치한 군사분계선 내의 땅굴 발견 사건 등은 남·북 관계에 진한 먹구름을 씌우고 대결구도를 한 층 더 강화시키는데 기여했다. 이는 남·북간 대화 시도가 각각의 국내정치·사회 영역에 이용되는 측면이 큰 것과도 연관이 컸다. 6·23 선언은 남·북 관계에 희망을 불러일으키기에 충분히 의미 있는 내용들을 담고 있었으나 그 결과는 더 큰 좌절을 야기하는 사건들에 묻혀들어 갔다. 독일의 동방정책과 비교할 때 남·북간의 대화와 대화시도의 의미를 양 지역의 내적 요인들과 깊이 연관시켜 보아야 할 이유가 여기에 있다.

영문 초록

President Park Chung-hee proclaimed a new concept of South-North relations in comparison to the hitherto position on June 23, 1973, to North Korea and all the nations of the world. This 6·23 Declaration represented the influence of West German Ostpolitik on Korean South-North relations at the time and it clearly showed that the South Korean government had given up the Hallstein Doctrine and adopted from Germany the idea of SouthKorea and North Korea entering the U.N. separately. Of course, Park's regime stressed that entrance to the U.N. should not in any way imply acknowledgement of North Korea as a sovereign independent state; and it should also not hamper work towards reunification. Park underlined the will of his regime to inaugurate official relations with the countries which endorsed the separate existence of North Korea. It effectively meant that South Korea endorsed North Korea politically as West Germany had done with East Germany. August 8, 1973, it was reported that Kim Dae-jung, the leader of the opposition party and former presidential candidate, was abducted in Japan presumably by the KCIA (Korean Central Intelligence Agency). Three weeks after Kim's kidnapping North Korea announced that they refused all dialogue, including political discussion and the Red Cross talks, as an act of protest against the incident. Tragically, an assassination attempt was made on the life of President Park Chung-hee by one Mun Se-kwang. The assassination attempt was unsuccessful, but the President's wife was killed. This tragic incident dealt a mortal blow to the continuation of the negotiations between the South and the North. The South Korean people were shocked when they heard that the crime was conspired, organized, and executed over as long as two years or more under a careful plan mapped out by the North Korean authorities. To make matters worse, three months later, on November 15, 1974, the spokesman of the U.N. Command announced the discovery of a tunnel which had been secretly dug by the North Korean army. According to the reports of the spokesman, the tunnel reached a point 1.2 kilometers inside the southern sector of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ). The U.N. Command estimated that it was large enough for a full armed regiment to pass through very quickly. Moreover, a rail-line had been established in the tunnel so it was easily able to be used to transport heavy artillery weapons. The South Korean government interpreted the construction of this tunnel as the telling proof that the North had been preparing for a surprise attack, in spite of all its propaganda about peace. In this tremulous and dangerous context dialogue between the South and the North in 1973-74 took on a fateful character. In 1974 Willy Brandt resigned from his post as Chancellor of the FRG and with this Ostpolitik began to loose its momentum and vitality. And, far away in northeast Asia, the tenuous attempts at rapprochement between South Korea and North Korea had lamentably reached a dead-end.

목차

Ⅰ. Introduction

Ⅱ. West German Ostpolitik and the 6.23 Declaration of President Park Chung-hee

Ⅲ. The Tragic Incidents for Korean South-North Relations and its Implications

Ⅳ. Conclusions

키워드

동방정책 6·23 선언 김대중 납치 박정희대통령 암살 미수 사건 북한군이 DMZ에 설치한 땅굴 발견 Ostpolitik 6·23 Declaration Kidnapping of Kim Dae-jung Assassination Attempt against President Park Chung-hee Discovery of Tunnel dug by the North Korean Army in DMZ