중소기업대출과 신용할당에 대한 연구

• 영문명: A Study on the Credit Rationing and Bank Loan for Small and Medium-sized Enterprises
• 발행기관: 동국대학교 경영연구원
• 저자명: 김명규(Kim, Myoung-kyou) 김석용(Kim, Seok-yong)
• 간행물 정보: 『경영과 사례연구』제30권 제2호, 37~74쪽, 전체 38쪽
• 주제분류: 사회과학 > 사회과학일반
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2007.12.30

영문 초록

Credit rationing is defined to be “a situation in which the demand for commercial loans exceeds the supply of these loans at the commercial loan rate quoted by the banks”. In Korea, small and medium-sized enterprises stand in disadvantageous position for bank loan and credit rationing has existed. There are some reasons for credit rationing, which are basically caused by small and medium-sized enterprises high transaction cost, risk, informational asymmetry, and insufficient collateral. There are now extensive literatures on credit rationing but in this thesis credit rationing is analyzed differently by contract theory. The example leads to several remarks. First, the example illustrates that even though asymmetric information is likely to be a pervasive phenomenon in financial markets, it does not in itself inevitably give rise to credit rationing. Second, credit market inefficiencies arise only as a result of exogenous restrictions imposed on the allowable set of contracts nevertheless credit rationing has existed because of various reasons. Credit rationing may be mitigated in bank loan for small and medium-sized enterprises by some devices. First, the bank can offer different loan contracts with variable collateral requirements. Second, the bank can use relationship lending which is one of the most powerful means available to reduce informational asymmetry in small firm finance. Third, the bank can use the credit guarantee system for small and medium-sized enterprises which provides guarantee for the repayment of loans rendered by financial institutions to them.

목차

Ⅰ. 서론

Ⅱ. 중소기업의 정의와 중소기업대출의 특성

Ⅲ. 신용할당의 정의 및 이론

Ⅳ. 중소기업대출의 신용할당 대안

Ⅴ. 결론

참고문헌

키워드

collateral contract theory credit guarantee credit rationing informational asymmetry relationship lending