Equilibrium Leadership in Tax Competition for Endogenous Capital Supply

• 발행기관: 한국재정학회(구 한국재정·공공경제학회)
• 저자명: Keisuke Kawachi Hikaru Ogawa Taiki Susa
• 간행물 정보: 『한국재정학회 학술대회 논문집』2019년도 추계학술대회 논문집, 1~15쪽, 전체 15쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 경제학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2019.10.25

영문 초록

In this paper, we reconsider the leadership of tax competition, focusing on a situation where total amount of capital competed by countries is endogenously determined. For the purpose, we model a timing game under asymmetric tax competition, in which the capital competed among two countries is supplied not only by the residents of the two countries, but also by exogenous investors, depending on the rate of return to capital in the integrated market and how accessible it is for investors outside of the countries. As a result, it is found that, when the capital market becomes more accessible for exogenous investors, sequential-move equilibria are more likely to be realized, in which one country leads and the other follows. Contrarily, only simultaneous-move equilibrium emerges, when the openness of the market is sufficiently small.

목차

1 Introduction

2 The Model

3 Equilibrium

4 Concluding Remarks

키워드

Tax competition Endogenous timing Capital supply Market access.