A Rationale for Export Insurance Subsidy

• 영문명: A Rationale for Export Insurance Subsidy
• 발행기관: 한국무역연구원
• 저자명: Yang Seung Lee
• 간행물 정보: 『무역연구』제10권 제1호, 125~146쪽, 전체 21쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 무역학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2014.02.28

영문 초록

To discuss an optimal trade policy, a game-theoretic model can be useful. Cooper-Riezman (1989) founded a one-shot game model to explain how a government chooses a trade policy, such as either export subsidy or export quota. This paper extends that model to a repeated version, a form that has not been attempted before. Repetition of the trade policy game raises interesting questions about how to maximize discounted national welfare under a condition of uncertainty. Surprisingly, a government actually can implement another policy instrument, such as export insurance subsidy, to improve discounted national welfare. It is hoped that this paper can contribute to explaining why export insurance subsidy is implemented despite the strengthened trend of free trade.

목차

Abstract

Ⅰ. Introduction

Ⅱ. Basic Model

Ⅲ. How to Reallocate Export Subsidy

Ⅳ. Discounted National Welfare

Ⅴ. Total Expectation

Ⅵ. Conclusion

References

키워드

Export Subsidy Repeated Game Strategic Trade Policy Uncertainty