러시아의 동북아 경제협력정책과 TSRㆍTKR 연결을 위한 경제적 협상전략 - 동북아시아 지역경제협력 가능성의 모색 -

• 영문명: Russia s Economic Cooperation Policy in Northeast Asia and Her Negotiation Strategy for TSR·TKR Linkage - In Search of Some Opportunity for the Regional Economic Cooperation -
• 발행기관: 한국동북아경제학회
• 저자명: 임현수(Lim, Hyun Soo)
• 간행물 정보: 『동북아경제연구』東北亞經濟硏究 第15卷 第2號, 115~149쪽, 전체 35쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 경제학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2003.08.31

영문 초록

In the early 1990s Russian foreign policy was tilted toward the West. Because of the loud criticisms from the domestic front, President Yeltsin made a U-turn toward a more balanced policy between the West and the East in mid-1990s. Those supporters of the Eurasianist school of foreign policy made some solid contributions in formulating a well-balanced policy toward Europe and Asia. From this context emerged the new Russia’s foreign policy in Northeast Asia, in which the relationships between Russia and China, Russia and Japan, and Russia and two Koreas deserve some additional attention. Russia has been pursuing the best of her interests from her relationships with China, Japan and two Koreas. Russia’s relationship with China is a strategic companionship which benefits both sides: strategically, both sides support multi-polar international system; economically, Russia sells weapons and large scale SOC projects, while China buys advanced military technologies and sells consumer products. Russia’s relationship with Japan is a kind of ‘hide and seek’ game: Japan wants Russia returns 4 islands in return for her economic aids and investments in Siberia, while Russia wants to get capital investments without returning all of 4 islands. Leaders of both countries worked creatively to solve this diplomatic debacle and move ahead for the normal relationship in the future. Relationships between Russia and two Koreas have been recently revolving on the agenda of connecting the trans-Siberian and the trans-Korean railways. During the approximately 3 years of negotiations between Russia and North Korea, the former has been quite attentive to those requests of the later. And the agreements between the two sides is turned out to be satisfactory for North Korea. For the time being South Korea has been patiently waiting for the closure of the negotiations, and readily welcomes the settlements of the other two parties. The rationale for this almost unconditional acceptance and welcoming of the TSRㆍTKR connection agreements is that of building up “national economic community” on Korean peninsula. Whether the position could be justified or not, would be judged by history in the not-so-far future. The former Soviet Union’s role during the second half of twentieth century in building up a Northeast Asian regional community was thoroughly negative. At the turn of twentieth century and beginning of twenty first century, Russia’s role in this respect is diametrically opposite to that of Soviet Union. As a good example of this completely new position, it might be worthwhile to examine the TSRㆍTKR connection policy of Putin’s Russia. From this line of logical conclusion, I expect that the realization of economic community in this region is not only plausible, but forthcoming.

목차

Ⅰ 서론

Ⅱ 러시아의 새로운 동북아 협력정책의 배경

Ⅲ 21세기의 문턱에서 본 러시아의 동북아 경제협력정책

Ⅳ TSRㆍTKR 연결과 러시아와 북한 및 남한과의 경제협상정책

Ⅴ 결론

키워드

동북아경제협력(North-east asian economic cooperation) TSR TKR 러시아(Russia) 북한(North Korea) 남한(South Korea)