한국기업 지배구조 개혁의 비혁신성과 향후 과제

• 영문명: The Anti - innovativeness of the Corporate Governance Reform in Korea
• 발행기관: 한국인사관리학회
• 저자명: 조태훈(Tae-Hun Joh)
• 간행물 정보: 『조직과 인사관리연구』인사관리연구 Vol.29 No.3, 229~273쪽, 전체 45쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 경영학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2005.09.01

국문 초록

우리나라의 재벌은 절대 왕정형(Ancien Regime)으로 특징 지워 질 수 있는 지배구조의 기본 틀을 유지해왔다. 재벌은 공산주의 체제의 몰락, 개방화, 민주화, 디지털화, 세계화의 조류가 급격히 확산? 심화된 1990년대까지 새로운 시대환경에 선제적으로 대응하기 위한 틀 바꿈의 자율적 자기혁신 대신 1960년대 이래군사정부 주도의 개발독재시대에 형성된 기본 틀에 집착해 왔다. 1997년의 국가부도 위기는 재벌의 현상유지(status quo)에의 집착이 본질개혁을 불가능하게 만들어 온 준(準) 균형상태(state of quasi-equilibrium)를 파괴하면서 패러다임 전환적 혁신을 이룰 수 있는 기회를 제공하였다. 본 논문은 이 위기에 의한 기회가 혁신동력으로 활용되어 지배구조의 기본 틀 바꿈이 이루어졌는가에 대한 평가와 앞으로의 과제를 제시함을 기본 목표로 추구하였다. 이를 위해1997년 말부터 2003년 말까지 진행되어온 지배구조 개혁 과정에 대해 경영학적, 경제학적, 법적, 사회학 관점에서 미시적"E 거시적 고찰을 시도하였다. 연구 결과는 지배구조 개혁이 패러다임 전환적 틀 바꿈 보다 미용적(cosmetic), 피상적(superficial), 지엽적(minor) 개혁에 국한되었음을 보여주었다. 또한 21세기형 구조로의 틀 바꿈을 위한 앞으로의 과제를 전제조건, 필요조건, 충분조건의 차원에서 제시하였다.

영문 초록

The reform of corporate governance in Korea has been widely touted as one of the most successful outcomes of joint reform efforts by the Kim Dae-Jung Government and the IMF. Previous governance structures were blamed for authoritarianism and arbitrariness in Korean enterprises that affected the Korean economy and led to Korea’s moratorium crisis of 1997. Korea has maintained essentially the same corporate governance structure since early 1960’s during the era of ‘industrialization at all cost’pursued by the military dictatorship government. Industrialization in Korea was initiated by the military hard-liners who seized power through military coup in 1961. President-General Park Chung Hee, the head of the military junta, was the architect of the Korean economic ‘miracle’. The Park Jung Hee paradigm of industrialization and economic development - government-led, centralized, and disciplined - has been considered as one of the most successful models of economic take-off from a poor-agrarian-underdeveloped nation to a fully developed state. The governance of Korean corporations was the product and legacy of a policy of export-oriented total mobilization for industrialization pursued by the military dictatorship from the 1960’s through the 1980’s. In assuming the role of enginesof economic development and primary tool of government’s economic policy, Korean companies grew into chaebol, or Korean family-managed conglomerates. The resulting system of corporate governance gainedthe fundamental characteristics of autocracy, non-transparency, oppressiveness, exploitativeness, and hereditary succession, which mirrored the military dictatorship of the nation and the tradition of ancien regime as well. The financial crises of 1997 called into question the prevailing Park Chung Hee paradigm of economic development and management. Chaebol and its corporate governance became the object of intense criticism from the Korean public opinion as well as from international financial institution and investors. The International Monetary Fund and International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) made reform of economic system, chaebol, and corporate governance prerequisites of an emergency bailout loan. Under pressure from the IMF/IBRD, and with widespread public support, the reform of corporate governance has become a top priority of the Korean government. This research provides a thorough examination of the processes and outcomes of over five years of corporate governance reform efforts by the Korean government, and presents new perspectives and insights concerning what should be done in the future. The reform of corporate governance has been pursued in conjunction with the chaebol reform. Called "5+3" agenda, the objectives of chaebol reform were mutually agreed upon in two steps by then President Kim Dae Jung and chaebol owners. The "5"denotes 1) increasing transparency in corporate management, 2) eliminating debt guaranties, 3) renovating corporate financial structures, 4) establishing core competencies and more equitable relationship with SMEs, and 5) increasing accountability of controlling shareholders and management. The "3" denotes 1) prohibiting chaebol’sdomination of finance, 2) suppressing interlocking investment and illegal insider transactions, 3) preventing improper bequests or gifts to heirs. Thus, the "5+3" chaebol and corporate governance reform plans ran concurrently and constituted an inseparable whole, seeking to completely reform chaebol. The most fundamental issue raised with regard to corporate governance, has been how to deal with the omnipotent power of chaebol owners. They are above corporate checks and balances and beyond government control and regulations. Chaebol has grown ‘too big too fail’ and the chaebol owners have built up an empire in which they reign as absolute monarchs in the ancien regime tradition. The reform of corporate governance aims at putting an end to t

목차

요약

1. 문제의 제기

2. 선진형 기업 지배구조의 의의, 본질적 특성 및 최근 개혁동향

3. 한국 재벌 기업지배구조의 본질적 특징, 병폐 및 선진화의 조건

4. 1997년 국가부도위기 이후 2003년 까지 추구되어 온 한국 기업지배구조 개혁의 과정, 내용 및 한계

5. 절대왕정(Ancien Régime)형 지배구조의 21세기화를 위한 핵심과제

6. 맺음말

참고문헌

Abstract