The Differential Benefits of Reputed Generalists CEOs over Tenure

• 발행기관: 강원대학교 경영경제연구소
• 저자명: Kwang-Joo Koo
• 간행물 정보: 『아태비즈니스연구』제12권 제4호, 87~105쪽, 전체 19쪽
• 주제분류: 인문학 > 문학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2021.12.31

영문 초록

Purpose - The purpose of this study was to explores how CEO general human capital, one of the most critical issues in recent research, affects compensation schemes. Design/methodology/approach - This study collected the CEOs of S&P500 companies from 2001 to 2009 and contains 4,155 CEO-firm-year observations and 704 different CEOs. Findings - First, only contingent bonus is affected by general human capital and reputation. Second, the career concerns of CEOs are relevant, especially when explaining CEO tenure. Third, we offer an alternative view of what determines the level of cash compensation schemes and the factors that affect the running of a firm. Fourth, we also suggest that the increase in general human capital can be explained by the increase in its relative importance in managing a modern firm. Overall, the results of this study do not only contribute to academics but also important to boards and shareholders. Research implications or Originality - This study intends to fill the gap in the extant literature by examining the relationship between general human capital and compensation schemes.First, we add to the compensation literature by arguing that a cash compensation scheme is efficient for generalist CEOs. We break down CEO cash compensation schemes into fixed and contingent bonus compensation and investigate whether general human capital differentially affects CEO cash compensation schemes, and thus, the sensitivity to unequal pay for human capital. Second, we contribute to the reputation literature by arguing that CEO perceived reputation also affects CEO compensation schemes.

목차

Ⅰ. Introduction

Ⅱ. Hypotheses and Literature Review

Ⅲ. Research Design

Ⅳ. Empirical Results

Ⅴ. Conclusion

키워드

Cash Compensation CEOs General Human Capital Reputation