Simple Characterizations of Potential Games and Zero-sum Equivalent Games

• 발행기관: 한국계량경제학회
• 저자명: Sung-Ha Hwang Luc Rey-Bellety
• 간행물 정보: 『JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY AND ECONOMETRICS』Vol.31 No.1, 1~13쪽, 전체 13쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 경제학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2020.03.31

영문 초록

We provide several tests to determine whether a game is a potential game or whether it is a zero-sum equivalent game—a game which is strategically equivalent to a zero-sum game in the same way that a potential game is strategically equivalent to a common interest game. We present a unified framework applicable for both potential and zero-sum equivalent games by deriving a simple but useful characterization of these games. This allows us to re-derive known criteria for potential games, as well as obtain several new criteria. In particular, we prove (1) new integral tests for potential games and for zero-sum equivalent games, (2) a new derivative test for zero-sum equivalent games, and (3) a new representation characterization for zero-sum equivalent games.

목차

1. INTRODUCTION

2. MAIN RESULTS

3. EXAMPLES

4. DISCUSSION

키워드

Potential Games Zero-Sum Games Zero-Sum Equivalent Games