Noncooperative and Cooperative International Product R&D with Spillovers

• 발행기관: 한국무역연구원
• 저자명: Il-Seok Yang
• 간행물 정보: 『무역연구』제14권 제3호, 33~43쪽, 전체 11쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 무역학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2018.06.19

영문 초록

This paper analyzes and compares the equilibrium levels of R&D expenditures, product quality, output, price, consumer surplus, and profit of a firm from noncooperative and cooperative product R&D games. This is done using an international duopoly model in which two firms produce differentiated products and compete in a third country’s market. It is shown that in a symmetric equilibrium: (i) R&D expenditure (hence, also the quality) and output are higher in a cooperative R&D game than a noncooperative game if R&D spillovers are strong, or the goods are sufficiently differentiated, except with no spillovers, and the results are reversed if R&D spillovers are weak, or the goods are not too differentiated and R&D spillovers are quite small; (ii) prices are the same in noncooperative and cooperative R&D games; (iii) consumer surplus in the third country is lower in a cooperative R&D game than a noncooperative game; and (iv) profit of each firm, and hence aggregate profit, is lower in a cooperative R&D game than a noncooperative game if R&D spillovers are strong, or the goods are sufficiently differentiated, except with no spillovers, and the results are reversed if R&D spillovers are weak, or the goods are not too differentiated and R&D spillovers are quite small.

목차

Ⅰ. Introduction

Ⅱ. The Basic Model

Ⅲ. Noncooperative Product R&D

Ⅳ. Cooperative Product R&D

Ⅴ. Concluding Remarks

키워드

Cooperation Cournot Competition Intra-industry Trade Product R&D R&D Spillovers