Firm Strategy in a National Election: Strategic Trade Policy Implications

• 영문명: Firm Strategy in a National Election: Strategic Trade Policy Implications
• 발행기관: 한국무역연구원
• 저자명: Yang Seung Lee
• 간행물 정보: 『무역연구』제10권 제4호, 143~155쪽, 전체 12쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 무역학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2014.09.30

영문 초록

In discussing a trade policy instrument, a game-theoretic model has been popularly utilized during the last few decades. Interactions between a government and private firms can be described as sequential because a government’s policy affects firms’ actions sequentially. Previous research studies have investigated how firms will react to a government’s policy. In fact, there is a situation in that firms should make a choice under political uncertainty. For instance, an election determines a type of government, which prefers a specific trade policy. In this case, firms can optimize their profits by anticipating election results. This study highlights firms’ reaction to a national election, which influences trade policy and offers strategic trade policy insights.

목차

Abstract

Ⅰ. Introduction

Ⅱ. Basic Model

Ⅲ. Structure of Game

Ⅳ. Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibrium

Ⅴ. Conclusion

References

키워드

Export Subsidy Repeated Game Strategic Trade Policy Uncertainty