地方稅體制에 대한 地域의 選好에 관한 硏究

• 영문명: A Study on Regions’ Preference among Local Tax Regimes
• 발행기관: 한국재정학회(구 한국재정·공공경제학회)
• 저자명: 文秉根(Byung-Keun Moon) 崔炳虎(Byung-Ho Choi)
• 간행물 정보: 『재정논집』재정논집 제10권, 290~316쪽, 전체 27쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 경제학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 1996.03.31

영문 초록

This paper analyzes regions’ preference among the Nash. merged and central government regimes in a model of tax competition between two heterogeneous regions, which differ in their endowments of two production factors mobile capital and immobile labor. In the Nash regime. regions play Cournot Nash game in tax rates without the intervention of central government. Using the class of utility functions with zero income effect of public service, we identify equilibrium tax rates, utilities, and efficiency properties under each regime. Then we identify the sets of endowment allocations that determine regions’ preference among the three regimes, and set for which the two regions will not agree to merge and hence efficiency gain will not realized without the central government’s intervention.

목차

Ⅰ. 序論

Ⅱ. 模型

Ⅲ. 各 租稅體制下의 均衡

Ⅳ. 生産要素의 相對的 賦存狀態와 租稅制度에 대한 選好

Ⅴ. 要約 및 結論

〈參考文獻〉

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