製造物責任原則과 Coase Theorem

• 영문명: Product Liability Rule and Coase Theorem
• 발행기관: 한국재정학회(구 한국재정·공공경제학회)
• 저자명: 李萬雨(M. W. Lee) 宋泰會(T .H. Song)
• 간행물 정보: 『재정논집』재정논집 제9권, 278~295쪽, 전체 18쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 경제학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 1995.03.31

영문 초록

This article attempts to analyze conditions that efficiency in resource allocation is unaffected by the rules of product liability, regardless of legislative liability rule between the parties. We prove that the Cease Theorem stating an efficiency to be unaffected by liability rule can be extensively applied to income distribution in the case of product liability. We also show that product liability has a characteristic that there exist transaction mechanism of the riskiness between producer and consumer, so that the risk premium can be negotiated through prices. 'This leads to the conclusion that under the rule of product liability if consumer has a perfect information for the product, any liability rule can reach pareto optimum, thus the distribution in surplus between the consumer and the producer will not be affected by being risk averse or not. It shows, thereforem, that how much informations consumers have is the crucial factor of relative efficiency of liability rules and that risk averseness, market imperfection in the insurance and the possibility of the 3rd injurer occurrence are the supplementary factors to determine the efficiency.

목차

Ⅰ. 製造物責任의 槪念과 特徵

Ⅱ. 製造物責任原則에 대한 論爭

Ⅲ. Coase Theorem의 適用條件

Ⅳ. 要約 및 結論

參考文獻