게임하의 動態的 最適租稅와 時系列一貫性

• 영문명: Game Theoretic Approach to Dynamic Optimal Taxation and Time - Consicstency
• 발행기관: 한국재정학회(구 한국재정·공공경제학회)
• 저자명: 金峻永(Junyoung Kim)
• 간행물 정보: 『재정논집』재정논집 제9권, 260~277쪽, 전체 18쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 경제학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 1995.03.31

영문 초록

In this work it is analyzed to extend the traditional approach to optinal taxation based on the static non-game framework to the game theoretic approach to dynamic optinal taxation. Here I consider two types of games between the government and the representative labor, Stackelberg game and Nash game. Under each game both dynamic optinal tax rate and dynamic labor supply are derived differentially. Dyamic optinal tax rate and dynamic labor supply are time-consistent under noncooperative Nash game, while they are time-inconsistent under Stackelberg game.

목차

1. 論文趣旨

2. 理論的 모델

3. 動態的 最適租稅

4. 스태클버그균형의 時系列非一貫性

5. 結論

참고문헌