蒙古ㆍ高麗의 兄弟盟約의 性格

• 영문명: On the Nature of the Brotherly Alliance Between the Mongols and Korea in 1219
• 발행기관: 백산학회
• 저자명: 高柄翊(Koh Byong-ik)
• 간행물 정보: 『백산학보』第6號, 23~78쪽, 전체 56쪽
• 주제분류: 인문학 > 역사학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 1969.06.01

영문 초록

As a result of the successful allied operation against the hordes of Khitans who fled into the soil of Koryo dynasty after their feebly reestablished Liao kingdom was struck both by the Chin empire and the newly rising Mongols, the Mongol commanders and the Korean generals made in the early 1219 an alliance of Elder-Younger Brothers relationship, avowing an eternal friendship between the two countries. The intention of the Mongol expedition to Korea was allegedly the mere crushing of the rebelling Khitan hordes, but in reality the Mongol commanders had already been previously instructed by Chinghis Khan to make an alliance with Koryo after crushing the rebels. The Mongols wanted to have an allied nation in the East at a time when they were busy in conquering their southern and western neighbors. The Mongols had by this time already subjugated the North China part of the decaying Chin empire, including the capital of Chin, Peking. They had also subjugated the Tangut kingdom, Si-Hsia. The Mongols were also having troubles with Central Asian kingdoms and soon Chinghis Khan had to embark on his expedition to the west that was to last for seven years. Since Chinghis’ attention was primarily directed to the south and west, he never bothered himself to lead an expedition to the East. Since, however, the Jurchen land in Manchuria, where both the Jurchens and the rebelling Khitans were making troubles, could mean a threat, he apparently intended to gain an alliance with Koryo, a country that had withstood, as admired by Khubilai Khan later, the Chinese invasions of the Sui and the early T’ang dynasties, and that could possibly align herself with the Chin empire against the Mongols. It seems unique in the process of the Mongol conquest that the Mongols ever intended to get an ally, instead of trying to conquer at once. This could come from the Mongol’s notion of Koryo, the succeeding country of once invincible Koguryo. Judging from the subsequent development of affairs between the Mongols and Koryo, we can retrospectively perceive that the aim of the Mongols was not so much having an ally in the East as exploiting economically the coveted products of Korea, such as otter skins, silk, gold, silver clothings, paper, brush, etc. It had been decided at the alliance that every year the Mongols send an emissary consisting of less than 10 men to Koryo by way of the Tung-chen (the Jand of the rebel Jurchen P’u-hsien Wan-nu, that is, the area of the Tumen River) to collect the annual tribute by Koryo. It is noteworthy that dispatching of emissaries was not bilateral. Only the Mongols were to come to Korea, not Koreans to Mongolia. This is comparable to the Liao-Sung and Chin-Mongol relations where the tribute-paying parties were not allowed to send emissaries to the tribute-receiving countries. In fact, for six years after the alliance, the Mongol emissaries came to Koryo, often more than once in a year, urging Koryo to comply with their demands. Their ever demanding and arrogant attitudes were much resented by Koryo officials, and at last in 1225 a Mongol emissary, Che-ku-yü, who was notorious for his arrogance, was assassinated on his way back. This incident entailed the severance of the diplomatic relations of the two countries. Many of these Mongol emissaries were recorded as having been dispatched by Temüge-Ochigin, the youngest brother of Chinghis Khan. Ochigin’s appanage was in the East, the extreme east of Mongolia, where no Mongols are said to have resided. Several months after the alliance, Chinghis Khan embarked on the expedition to the West, entrusting the command of national affairs during his absency to Ochigin. Apparently much of the yearly tribute from Koryo found their way to the orda (camp)of Ochigin, and this explains the eagerness of his emissaries to Koryo to get as much as they could.