대리인 이론의 비판적 분석과 기업지배구조연구의 새로운 시각

• 영문명: A Critical Analysis of Agency Theory and a New Perspective of Corporate Governance Research
• 발행기관: 한국인사조직학회
• 저자명: 김양민(Yangmin Kim)
• 간행물 정보: 『인사조직연구』인사·조직연구 제17권 제2호, 155~194쪽, 전체 40쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 경영학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2009.06.30

국문 초록

대리인 이론은 사회과학 전체에서 가장 논쟁의 여지가 많은 이론 중 하나일 것이다. 본 논문은 대리인 이론을 고찰하고, 그 기본 가정들을 비판적으로 분석한다. 그 가정들은 (1) 인간은 이기적이고 남을 위해서 자신의 이익을 포기하지 않는 존재들이며, (2) 다양한 주주구성원들은 명확하고도 동일한 요구와 이해관계를 갖고, (3) 이사회를 어떻게 구성하느냐에 따라 의 구성에 따라 기업성과가 영향을 받으며, 그리고 그 영향은 상황에 관계없이 대체로 일정할 것이라는 것이다. 또한 본 논문은 대리인 이론을 바탕으로 한 실증 연구들을 분석한다. 인사조직분야의 기업지배구조연구에서는 대리인 이론을 바탕으로, 기업의 지배구조가 절대로 가져서는 안 되는 특성들을 열거하여 그것들이 기업성과에 미치는 악영향을 찾아내려고 노력해 왔다. Finkelstein & Mooney(2003)는 그러한 특성들을 Usual Suspects라고 불렀는데, Usual Suspects는 낮은 사외이사의 비율, CEO의 이사회 의장직 겸직, 그리고 철저히 현금으로만 구성되는 경영자 및 이사진의 급여 등을 포함한다. 그러나 실제 이러한 Usual Suspects를 대상으로 한 실증 연구 성과는 대단히 빈약하고 많은 경우 일관성이 없는 결과들을 도출해 왔다. 본 논문은 이러한 실증연구 결과를 고려하여 대리인 이론을 바탕으로 한 기업지배구조 연구 중 특히 이사진의 통제역할을 둘러싼 연구들의 근본적인 재검토가 필요하다고 주장한다. 대리인 이론에 대한 비판적 분석을 바탕으로, 본 논문은 대리인 이론의 대안 내지는 기업지배구조 연구에서 새 방향을 제시할 수 있는 소 이론들에 대한 간단한 고찰과, 그러한 이론들이 실증 연구들로 연결될 수 있도록, 실제 한국 경영환경을 고려한 제안을 제시한다.

영문 초록

Agency theory is probably one of the most controversial theories in social science. This paper reviews and assesses agency theory, the assumptions, and the extant empirical work. Agency relationship is defined as a contract under which one or more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the agent. If there is conflict in interests between agent(s) and principal(s), the agent might act to pursue his/her interest at the expense of principal’s interest. The principal can solve this agency problem by incurring agency cost or aligning the interests of agent to those of the principal’s. Agency cost is defined as the sum of the monitoring expenditure by the principal, the bounding expenditure by the agent, and the residual loss. Management research, influenced by agency theory, has set up a number of examples of what corporate governance should not have. Finkelstein & Mooney (2003) refer to the factors inherent in these examples as the ‘usual suspects’ including relatively few outside (independent) directors on the board of directors, only cash compensation to or no share ownership by CEO and directors, and CEOs who also serve as board chairs (i.e., CEO duality). However, rigorous research on corporate governance has not provided much clear and consistent evidence that these ‘usual suspects’ are meaningfully connected to firm performance. For example, while previous studies on the board generally agree that non-executive or outside directors play an important monitoring role, no consistent empirical evidence has been found. Agrawal & Knoeber (1996) reported a negative correlation between the proportion of outside directors and Tobin’s Q. Some other studies report that outside director proportion has a positive relationship with firm value, suggesting that companies with relatively more independent direc-tors tend to be more profitable than those with fewer independent directors. Some studies, on the other hand, found no statistically significant relationship between board composition and firm performance. In a meta-analysis of 54 studies on board composition, Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson (1998) found no substantive relationship between board composition and firm performance. In a similar vein, Finkelstein & Mooney (2003) found no significant differences between high performing companies and low performing companies in terms of number of outside directors, director shareholdings, board size, and CEO duality. According to Ghoshal (2005), what is most curious is that despite lack of empirical support, agency theory still dominates academic research on corporate governance. Daily, Dalton, & Cannella (2003) explained the enormous popularity of agency theory with the following two factors. First, agency theory is an extremely simple theory, in which large corporations are reduced to only two participants-principals and agents, and the interest of these two constituencies are assumed to be clear and consistent. Second, the assumption of humans as homo-economicus, who are opportunistic and unwilling to sacrifice personal interest for the interest of others, is both age old and widespread. This paper critically examines the assumptions of agency theory and of the researches based on agency theory. Those assumptions are: (1) humans are self interested and generally unwilling to sacrifice personal interest for the interest of others, (2) various ownership constituencies have clear and homogeneous interests and needs, (3) boards of directors do influence firm performance, and the influence of boards on firm performance will be consistent regardless of the situations. Regarding the first assumption, the root can be found in the works of the grandfather of the modern Economics -Adam Smith. More than two hundred years ago, Smith predicted that joint stock company- an equivalent of the modern public co

목차

초록

Ⅰ. 서론

Ⅱ. 대리인 이론의 고찰

Ⅲ. 대리인 이론의 전제와 그 보완책들

Ⅳ. 대리인 이론을 바탕으로 한 연구 성과：‘Usual Suspects’를 중심으로

V. 대리인 이론을 보완하는 제안들

Ⅵ. 맺음말

참고문헌

ABSTRACT

키워드

대리인 이론 기업지배구조 사회적 자본 이사회의 역할과 영향력 Agency Theory Corporate Governance Social Capital The roles and influences of Board of directors