한국 농작물재해보험 시장에서의 역선택과 도덕적 해이

• 영문명: Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard in the Korean Crop Insurance Market
• 발행기관: 한국농업경제학회
• 저자명: 이주관(Lee, Jukwan) 정진화(Jung, Jin Hwa)
• 간행물 정보: 『농업경제연구』55권 1호, 29~47쪽, 전체 19쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 경제학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2014.03.30

영문 초록

Crop insurance p lays an important role in stabilizing farm income. Yet previous studies have proved that market failure can occur in the insurance market because of asymmetric information. This paper empirically tested the existence of adverse selection and moral hazard in the crop insurance market , focusing on rice farms in South Korea. We ran pooled logit and tobit regressions for the test of adverse selection, and fixed effect panel regression for the test of moral hazard. The data were obtained from the Korean Farm Household Economy Survey for the years 2008~ 2012. The empirical results indicated that high-risk farms have a larger tendency to buy insurance, and the amount of effort for alleviating damage from natural disaster shrinks when the farm has insurance and the risk premium is large. Therefore, for the sustainable crop insurance market, measures are needed in order to alleviate the problems of adverse selection and moral hazard in crop insurance.

목차

Ⅰ. 서 론

II. 농가의 보험가입과 재해방지노력

III. 연구모형과 데이터

IV. 분석결과

V. 결론

키워드

Crop Iunsrance Asymmetric Information Adverse Selection Moral Hazard