메커니즘 디자인을 활용한 배 의무자조금 거출기준 분석

• 영문명: An Analysis of Mandatory Check-off Program Using Mechanism Design : an Application to Korean Pears
• 발행기관: 한국농업경제학회
• 저자명: 박지원(Jiwon Park) 송양훈(Yanghoon Song)
• 간행물 정보: 『농업경제연구』57권 3호, 1~36쪽, 전체 36쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 경제학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2016.09.30

영문 초록

The voluntary check-off program for pears in Korea has been in operation since 2004. However, its operation has not reached its full capacity since it collects check-off indirectly from cooperatives, not directly from individual farmers. To enhance the collection and operational efficiency, a mandatory check-off program has been proposed. However, if an enforcement mechanism to prevent farmers from free-riding and a proper level of willingness-to-pay to induce farmers to pay are not devised, the mandatory program will fail. To design an efficient collection mechanism, willingness-to-pay for the check-off has been sur-veyed first. In the survey, it was found that farmers have incentives to lie about their true willing-ness-to-pay and to free-ride. This cheating behaviors make the above maximum collection infeasible. To control the cheating behaviors of the farmers and to design an incentives and participation com-patible check-off collection mechanism, the mechanism design in game theory has been used. According to the mechanism designed, the optimal unit check-off levels are KRW9.79/box for ‘per box’ design and KRW0.28/wrapper for ‘per wrapper’ design. Thus, the total check-offs are estimated to be KRW222million with participation rate of 73% for ‘per box’ program and KRW365million with participation rate of 75% for ‘per wrapper’ program. Thus, ‘per wrapper’ mechanism is found to be more appropriate with larger amount of total check-off and higher participation rate.

목차

Ⅰ. 서 론

Ⅱ. 배 자조금 현황

Ⅲ. 연구방법

Ⅳ. 분석결과

Ⅴ. 결 론

키워드

Pear Check-off Mechanism Design