Monotone Pure Strategy Equilibria in First Price Menu Auctions

• 영문명: Monotone Pure Strategy Equilibria in First Price Menu Auctions
• 발행기관: 한국계량경제학회
• 저자명: Seungjin Han
• 간행물 정보: 『한국계량경제학회 학술대회 논문집』2009년 하계학술대회, 1~34쪽, 전체 34쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 경제학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2009.08.30

영문 초록

This paper studies the first-price menu auctions, with asymmetric bidders, interdependent values, and affiliated signals, in which bidders submit menus of multidimensional contracting decisions and the decision maker (DM) chooses a contracting decision from a menu that she accepts. The interdependent values generically induces a continuum of continuation equilibria, one of which the DM chooses to follow for her contracting decision choice. It establishes the existence of a continuum of monotone pure-strategy equilibria, each of which depends on bidders’ beliefs on the continuation equilibrium that the DM chooses to follow. The continuum of monotone pure-strategy equilibria is characterized in terms of how sensitive it is to bidders’ beliefs on the continuation equilibrium. It identifies a belief-free monotone pure-strategy equilibrium that survives in any continuation equilibrium upon any bidder’s deviation.

목차

1 Introduction

2 Preliminaries

3 Modified First-Price Menu Auctions

4 A Continuum of TMPSEs

5 Strong Robustness

6 Discussion