The Effects of Litigants Wealth and Stake Size on Litigation Outcomes

• 영문명: The Effects of Litigants Wealth and Stake Size on Litigation Outcomes
• 발행기관: 한국계량경제학회
• 저자명: Kyung Hwan Baik In-Gyu Kim
• 간행물 정보: 『한국계량경제학회 학술대회 논문집』2009년 공동학술대회, 1~28쪽, 전체 28쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 경제학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2008.11.30

영문 초록

We develop two models of litigation in which the probability of winning for a litigant depends on opposing attorneys relative capacity and effort levels. In the models, money can buy high-capacity attorneys; the plaintiff s attorney works either under a contingent fee or under an hourly fee, but the defendant s attorney works under an hourly fee. We find: (i) a litigant s wealth contributes only a little to an increase in her expected payoff; (ii) as stake size increases, the increasing rate of effort of the plaintiff s attorney under the contingent fee exceeds that of himself under the hourly fee as well as that of the defendant s attorney; (iii) thus, if the stake size is big enough, the contingent-fee scheme brings the plaintiff a more payoff than the hourly-fee scheme. These findings are applied to the O.J. Simpson trial and to the recent tobacco litigation in the United States.

목차

1. Introduction

2. The contingent-fee model

3. The hourly-fee model

4. The effects of wealth and stake size

5. Concluding remarks

키워드

Effects of wealth and stake size Contingent and hourly fees Attorneys capacity Tobacco litigation