Weakened Liberal Rule Respecting Others’ Consensus: An Axiomatic Characterization

• 영문명: Weakened Liberal Rule Respecting Others’ Consensus: An Axiomatic Characterization
• 발행기관: 한국계량경제학회
• 저자명: Seongkyu Park
• 간행물 정보: 『한국계량경제학회 학술대회 논문집』2009년 공동학술대회, 1~17쪽, 전체 17쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 경제학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2008.11.30

영문 초록

We introduce the strong quasi-liberal rule, which is an extension of the strong liberal rule in Kasher and Rubinstein (1997) through the requirement of at least one agreement. We provide an axiomatic characterization of strong quasi-liberal rule. Similarly, we generalize the order of the rule (associated with the degree of minimum agreement requirement) to match the Consent Rules in Samet and Schmeidler (2003). The domain is extended to allow an additional proxy opinion for each individual. We show that strong quasi-liberal rule of any finite order (associated with the degree of minimum agreement requirement) converges in probability to the strong liberal rule in a specific setting.

목차

1 Introduction

2 Basic Concepts

3 Main Results

4 Conclusion and Remarks

키워드

Consent Rules Convergence Liberalism Proxy Voting