The sequential coalition formation in the patent pool game with externality

• 영문명: The sequential coalition formation in the patent pool game with externality
• 발행기관: 한국계량경제학회
• 저자명: Sunha Myong
• 간행물 정보: 『한국계량경제학회 학술대회 논문집』2009년 공동학술대회, 1~26쪽, 전체 26쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 경제학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2008.11.30

영문 초록

In this paper, we consider a situation in which several …rms form a patent pool to reduce their marginal costs in the Cournot market. The game consists of two stages. In the …rst stage, patent holders form patent pools under the alternating-o¤ers bargaining game, while in the second stage, all …rms compete in the market. In the symmetric case, patent holders form either one grand coalition or two asymmetric coalitions according to the ratio of patent holders to the total competitors. The total pro…t of patent holders is maximized when the grand coalition is formed in the equilibrium. Finally, we show that the patent pool can mitigate the patent thicket problem under certain conditions.

목차

1 Introduction

2 Preliminaries

3 The model

4 The sequential coalition formation in the patent pool game with externality

5 The patent thicket problem

6 Conclusions

키워드

patent pool patent thicket problem alternating-o¤ers bargaining game Markovperfect equilibrium