학술논문
Art, Museums and Contests: Private vs. Public Provision
이용수 10
- 영문명
- 발행기관
- 서울대학교 경제연구소
- 저자명
- Francisco Garcia-Sobrecases Sanghack Lee
- 간행물 정보
- 『Seoul Journal of Economics』Seoul Journal of Economics Volume 13 No.1, 1~19쪽, 전체 18쪽
- 주제분류
- 경제경영 > 경제학
- 파일형태
- 발행일자
- 2000.03.31
4,960원
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국문 초록
영문 초록
This paper examines revenue-raising competition among art museums when the government gives matching grants to one of them. Matching grants are complementary to revenues raised by the museums. Revenue-raising and revenue-spending activities of the museums are assumed to generate positive externalities to society. This paper derives Nash equilibrium revenues raised by the museums. The outcome is then compared with the socially optimal level of the revenues. Depending upon the type of social welfare function and the extent of externalities, the revenues raised by the museums can be greater than, equal to, or smaller than the social optimum. This paper also discusses the role of the matching mechanism of the government with which the Nash equilibrium can be equated to the social optimum.
목차
Abstract
Ⅰ. Introduction
Ⅱ. Discusssion on the Economics of Museums and Public Policy
Ⅲ. The Model of Contest among Museums and Goverment Grant
Ⅳ. Concluding Remarks
References
키워드
해당간행물 수록 논문
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- Art, Museums and Contests: Private vs. Public Provision
- Tax-Rate Uncertainty, Tax Exemption, and Tax Evasion
- Incentive Delegation and Collusion
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