地域間 租稅競爭과 中央政府

• 영문명: Regional Coordination and Central Government Intervention in a Regional Tax Competition
• 발행기관: 한국재정학회(구 한국재정·공공경제학회)
• 저자명: 文秉根(Byung-Ceun Moon) 崔炳虎(Byeongho Choe)
• 간행물 정보: 『재정논집』재정논집 제11권 제2호, 75~103쪽, 전체 29쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 경제학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 1996.12.31

영문 초록

This paper examines the justification of central government intervention in a model of regional tax competition with the consideration of the possibility of regional coordination. We use a model of tax competition between two heterogeneous regions, which differ in their endowment of two production factors. We answer to the question that whether an individual region desires the central government intervention or not, even though the intervention is socially desirable. Using a specific type of utility function under which the equilibrium resulted from regional coordination is efficient, we identify the set of endowment allocations that determine regions’ preferences among the three tax regimes: the Nash non-cooperative regime, the coordinative regime, and the central government regime. Using the result, we identify the endowment allocation set under which the central government intervention is desired by an individual region. We find that the central government intervention is desired by an individual region if the region’s utility level resulted form Nash tax competition is lower than the Pareto efficient level and the regions are not able to achieve an Pareto improvement by them-selves.

목차

Ⅰ. 序論

Ⅱ. 基本模型 및 均衡의 性質

Ⅲ. 體制에 대한 지역들의 選好: 所得再分配가 없는 中央政府 개입

Ⅳ. 體制에 대한 지역들의 選好: 所得再分配를 초래하는 中央政府 개입

Ⅴ. 中央政府 개입의 必要性

Ⅵ. 要約 및 結論

[參考文獻]

[附錄]