A model of endogenous party membership and platforms with opportunistic politicians

• 발행기관: 한국재정학회(구 한국재정·공공경제학회)
• 저자명: Kwang-ho Kim
• 간행물 정보: 『한국재정학회 학술대회 논문집』2011년도 춘계학술대회 논문집, 4~25쪽, 전체 22쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 경제학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2011.04.30

영문 초록

We model endogenous party membership and party platforms when party activists have different policy preferences and different priorities. In our model, party activists are heterogeneous not only in their ideal policy but also in their intensity to pursue policy issues vis-a-vis the spoils from office. We provide existence and characterization results for an equilibrium in which (ⅰ) party activists choose their party affiliation with correct anticipation of the choices by others, and (ⅱ) the resulting party platforms are consistent with the affiliation choice. This model offers an explanation of the overlaps in ideology between political parties. It also provides insights into the inner composition of political parties with different size.

목차

Abstract

1. Introduction

2. Environment

3. Party membership choice with given Platforms

4. Party membership choice with endogenous platforms: sincere voting

5. Party membership choice with endogenous platforms: strategic voting

6. Concluding remarks

References