학술논문
기반시설부담금의 합리적 연계성에 관한 연구
이용수 51
- 영문명
- A Study on the Dual Rational Nexus of Development Impact Fee in Korea
- 발행기관
- 안양대학교 수도권발전연구소
- 저자명
- 김동윤
- 간행물 정보
- 『수도권연구』제4호, 41~62쪽, 전체 22쪽
- 주제분류
- 사회과학 > 지역개발
- 파일형태
- 발행일자
- 2007.11.01
5,440원
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국문 초록
영문 초록
This study aims at the valuation of the Development Impact Fee system effectuated recently, and the presentation of the betterment in the system. Reviewing theories on the selection of financial resources for the local infrastructure costs and examples in America, the system is tested on the basis of dual rational nexus standards which are also raised by the Constitutional Court cases in Korea.
The population growth paths under IF(impact fee) and CS(cost sharing) schemes cross at a specific date t＊. A city developing under the CS scheme has a smaller population early in its history than a city evolving under the IF scheme, and a larger population later in its history. Many U.S. cities have switched from a cost sharing to an impact fee scheme in mid-course. Suppose the city switches from CS to IF at the date after t＊, the equilibrium population of the city at that time is smaller than the level achieved under CS. But since growth is irreversible the city cannot shrink. Instead, growth stops after the switch and does not resume until enough time has passed to raise the equilibrium population under IF up to the population under CS. This result matches conventional wisdom, which asserts that impact fees retard growth.
Essentially impact fees require that each new development project pay its pro-rata share of the cost of new capital facilities required to serve that development. Many U.S. courts have developed guidelines for constitutionally valid impact fees, based on "rational nexus" standards. The standards set by court cases generally require that an impact fee meet a two-part test: 1) The need for new facilities must be created by new development; and 2) The expenditure of impact fee revenues must provide benefit to the fee-paying development.
This study shows that the Development Impact Fee system is not valid since it does not meet the standards derived from the Korean Constitutional Court cases, and that the Infrastructure Linkage System just prior to the current system is close to the standards. As a result it is desirable to abolish the former and to revive the latter which was composed of Density Control District and Infrastructure Charge District.
Additionally the implications of U.S. examples should be utilized positively: 1) The system must be operated in connection with plans such as capital improvement program: 2) A variety of development fees must be consolidated and operated on the rational nexus standards: and 3) local governments, developers, and other parties interested have to communicate and negotiate on the social costs caused by developments to make the sound culture of regional planning.
The population growth paths under IF(impact fee) and CS(cost sharing) schemes cross at a specific date t＊. A city developing under the CS scheme has a smaller population early in its history than a city evolving under the IF scheme, and a larger population later in its history. Many U.S. cities have switched from a cost sharing to an impact fee scheme in mid-course. Suppose the city switches from CS to IF at the date after t＊, the equilibrium population of the city at that time is smaller than the level achieved under CS. But since growth is irreversible the city cannot shrink. Instead, growth stops after the switch and does not resume until enough time has passed to raise the equilibrium population under IF up to the population under CS. This result matches conventional wisdom, which asserts that impact fees retard growth.
Essentially impact fees require that each new development project pay its pro-rata share of the cost of new capital facilities required to serve that development. Many U.S. courts have developed guidelines for constitutionally valid impact fees, based on "rational nexus" standards. The standards set by court cases generally require that an impact fee meet a two-part test: 1) The need for new facilities must be created by new development; and 2) The expenditure of impact fee revenues must provide benefit to the fee-paying development.
This study shows that the Development Impact Fee system is not valid since it does not meet the standards derived from the Korean Constitutional Court cases, and that the Infrastructure Linkage System just prior to the current system is close to the standards. As a result it is desirable to abolish the former and to revive the latter which was composed of Density Control District and Infrastructure Charge District.
Additionally the implications of U.S. examples should be utilized positively: 1) The system must be operated in connection with plans such as capital improvement program: 2) A variety of development fees must be consolidated and operated on the rational nexus standards: and 3) local governments, developers, and other parties interested have to communicate and negotiate on the social costs caused by developments to make the sound culture of regional planning.
목차
Ⅰ. 머리말
Ⅱ. 기반시설 재원 선택과 도시성장관리
Ⅲ. 우리나라의 기반시설부담금
Ⅳ. 기반시설부담금 제도 개선방향
Ⅴ. 맺음말
참고문헌
ABSTRACT
Ⅱ. 기반시설 재원 선택과 도시성장관리
Ⅲ. 우리나라의 기반시설부담금
Ⅳ. 기반시설부담금 제도 개선방향
Ⅴ. 맺음말
참고문헌
ABSTRACT
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참고문헌
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