The United States and North Korea: Multilateralism and Security

• 영문명: The United States and North Korea: Multilateralism and Security
• 발행기관: 한국공공정책학회
• 저자명: Joel M. Jenswold Mary Ann Kenney Micahel Carnuccio
• 간행물 정보: 『공공정책연구』한국공공정책연구 제15호, 121~131쪽, 전체 11쪽
• 주제분류: 사회과학 > 정책학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2004.06.01

영문 초록

Current tensions between the United States and North Korea are centered on the pursuit of a nuclear program by North Korea and nuclear nonproliferation. The Agreed Framework has collapsed amid mutual suspicions and recriminations. Efforts to resume negotiations have floundered as there is disagreement on even the most basic elements, including how many countries should participate. While the United States does not trust North Korea, the regime in Pyongyang is equally suspicious of American motives, especially considering recent rhetoric from the Bush administration and a policy of regIme change elsewhere. The authors conclude that the United States is most likely seeking either regime change or enfeeblement of the North Korean regime, outcomes clearly unacceptable to Pyongyang. The North Korean government is most likely adopting the familiar Cold VvT ar tactic of using nuclear weapons for prestige and leverage? as so-called "bargaining chips". The paper traces recent events in the relationship between North Korea and the United States, highlighting specific points that seem to be intractable. In particular, the authors examine American policy changes between the Clinton and Bush administrations, and consider options for the United States under the current conditions. Whatever its true motives, the current American approach is both unproductive and diplomatically expensive, creating friction even with South Korea. Both complete American military withdrawal from Korea and unilateral military action are unrealistic options for the United States. This leaves alternative forms of coercion (probably economic sanctions) or diplomacy (possibly including "diplomatic brinkmanship"). Economic sanctions rarely work as intended, and they are likely to be especially ineffective in the case of North Korea. This leaves a diplomatic solution as the most feasible option. The American insistence on multilateral negotiations appears to be a welcome departure from the pattern of unilateralism displayed by the Bush administration elsewhere, but the North Korean concern with prestige and economic reward for abandoning their nuclear program fuels their insistence on bilateral talks with the United States. There are excellent reasons for a multilateral approach; indeed, the authors stress that no durable solution is otherwise possible. However, there is no intrinsic reason to refuse bilateral negotiations as an initial step. The United States may do well to defer the leading role to South Korea, whose interests in this matter are just as compelling and far more immediate.

목차

Abstract

Ⅰ. Current American Policy:

Ⅱ. Viability and Purpose of Economic Sanctions

Ⅲ. Other American Policy Options

References