Identifying Conditions for and Israel-Syria Peace: A Game Theoretic Analysis

• 영문명: Identifying Conditions for and Israel-Syria Peace: A Game Theoretic Analysis
• 발행기관: 한국공공정책학회
• 저자명: Steven B. Redd
• 간행물 정보: 『공공정책연구』한국공공정책연구 제13호, 253~279쪽, 전체 27쪽
• 주제분류: 사회과학 > 정책학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2003.06.01

영문 초록

The election of Benjamin Netanyahu as Prime Minister of Israel in 1996, and Ariel Sharon in 2001, signaled to many the end of any possible peace with Syria previously begun by Labor governments under Rabin, Peres, and Barak, Likud leaders such as 'Bibi' Netanyahu and Ariel Sharon are seen as rather hard line conservatives who would not "trade land for peace," However, this argument fails to consider the domestic factors that play into any international peace agreement between Israel and Syria, The appropriate historical example I offer is Nixon's 1972 visit to China after which many stated that "only Nixon can go to China," Using Theory of Moves (TOM) (Brams 1994), and the Rationality of Surprise (Brams 1997) I show that the conditions for peace between Israel and Syria would be more favorable under a Likud government than under a Labor government because of domestic political factors, Therefore, by extension, "only 'Bibi' or Sharon can go to Damascus,"

목차

Identifying Conditions for and Israel-Syria Peace: A Game Theoretic Analysis

Abstract

1. Introduction

2. Theory of Moves(TOM)

3. The Rationality of Surprise

4. TOM and the Rationality of Surprise

5. The Israel Syria Peace Process

6. Conclusion

References

Appendix