코스닥기업의 소유구조와 대리비용

• 영문명: The Agency Costs and Ownership Structure of the companies listed on the KOSDAQ.
• 발행기관: 한국산업경영시스템학회
• 저자명: 황동섭(Dong-Sub Hwang)
• 간행물 정보: 『산업경영시스템학회지』제28권 제1호, 105~113쪽, 전체 9쪽
• 주제분류: 공학 > 산업공학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2005.03.01

영문 초록

I investigate whether the efficient ratios used as the proxies of the agency costs maintained by Ang et al.(2000) is significant. Utilizing a sample of 77 manufacturing companies listed on the KOSDAQ from the TS2000 of the KSDA, The results are as follows. Agency costs are found to be decreasing with the ownership share of controlling shareholders and accounting performance becomes higher. But firm value measured by Tobin's Q ratio becomes lower according as the ownership of the controlling shareholders increases. If agency costs decrease in proportion to controlling shareholder's share, firm value should be higher according to the agency theory by Jensen and Meckling(1976). But the results of the empirical test of this study are inconsistent with Jensen and Meckling's(l976). Therefore the following study on the more useful proxies stand for agency costs should be needed.

목차

Abstract

1. 서론

2. 소유구조와 대리비용

3. 실증분석

4. 결론

참고문헌