Two Alternative Sequences of WTO Negotiations: Implications for Welfare

• 영문명: Two Alternative Sequences of WTO Negotiations: Implications for Welfare
• 발행기관: 세종대학교 경제통합연구소
• 저자명: Basudeb Guha-Khasnobis
• 간행물 정보: 『Journal of Economic Integration』제19권 제2호, 271~288쪽, 전체 18쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 경제학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2004.06.30

영문 초록

We develop a partial equilibrium, sequential model of trade negotiation between an OECD country and two developing countries. First, we show that there are substantive qualitative and quantitative differences in the state of market access and domestic support that emerge under possible alternative sequences in which the negotiating game can be played. We then explore the welfare implications of such alternative sequences on the various stakeholders within the OECD. The welfare outcomes point to various lobbying activities which can influence the trade negotiator and contribute to the confusion and disagreement on who should commit to its policies first.

목차

Ⅰ. Introduction

Ⅱ. The Model

Ⅲ. Conclusion

키워드

WTO Sequential Welfare Lobbying Tariffs