International Joint Ventures and Endogenous Protection

• 영문명: International Joint Ventures and Endogenous Protection: A Political-Economy Approach
• 발행기관: 세종대학교 경제통합연구소
• 저자명: Laixun Zhao
• 간행물 정보: 『Journal of Economic Integration』제12권 제4호, 548~560쪽, 전체 13쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 경제학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 1997.12.31

영문 초록

This paper constructs a model of international joint ventures (JVs) with political-economy considerations as the main motivation. A foreign firm decides whether to undertake full ownership foreign direct investment (FDI), or to form a JV with a home firm, while the home firm lobbies against FDI. It is shown that the level of lobbying is lower in the JV regime than in the FDI regime if the foreign firm transfer sufficiently advanced technology to the home firm through the JV. However, if the foreign firm anticipates future protectionist threats and forms a JV with the home firm beforehand (quid pro quo JV), then the foreign firm`s profit increases and the home firm`s level of lobbying decreases. (JEL Classification: F21, F12)

목차

Ⅰ. Introduction

Ⅱ. The Basic Model

Ⅲ. Quid Pro Quo JV

Ⅳ. Conclusions