Do Diversionary Incentives Affect Korea-Japan Historical Disputes?

• 발행기관: 한국학술연구원
• 저자명: Wonjae Hwang Misa Nishikawa
• 간행물 정보: 『Korea Observer』Vol 48, No 4, 733~764쪽, 전체 32쪽
• 주제분류: 사회과학 > 정치외교학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2017.12.30

영문 초록

Do diversionary incentives affect Korea-Japan historical disputes? We argue that Japanese political leaders use diversionary foreign policy, when public approval ratings are low and the government at the legislative level is weak. However, when the government is strong, approval ratings do not necessarily drive such diversionary behavior. We support our claims by testing the hypothesis using the data on Korea-Japan historical disputes and hostile actions between 1998 and 2016. The findings improve our understanding of the diversionary use of foreign policy in general and the effects of Japanese domestic politics on the historical disputes, specifically.

목차

I. Introduction

II. Korea-Japan Historical Disputes

III. Government Strength and Diversionary Incentives of Initiating Disputes

IV. Research Design

V. Results

VI. Conclusions

References

Appendix

키워드

Korea Japan Historical Disputes diversionary use of force government strength