Nash Implementation and Opportunity Equilibrium

• 영문명: Nash Implementation and Opportunity Equilibrium
• 발행기관: 한국계량경제학회
• 저자명: Biung-Ghi Ju
• 간행물 정보: 『한국계량경제학회 학술대회 논문집』2008년 하계학술대회, 1~25쪽, 전체 25쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 경제학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2008.08.30

영문 초록

Extending the formulation of market institution in general equilibrium analysis, an economic institution is formulated by a system “opportunities” the institution offers to its members. An opportunity system is a non-empty set of profiles of individual opportunity sets (subsets of alternatives). An alternative is an opportunity equilibrium under a system if there is an opportunity profile in the system such that the alternative maximizes each agent’s well-being over his opportunity set in the profile. Examples are Walrasian equilibrium, Lindahl equilibrium, valuation equilibrium by Mas-Colell (1980), equal opportunity equilibrium by Thomson (1994), etc. The main results show that this formulation of economic institutions by opportunity systems is closely related with the alternative formulation by game forms in Implementation Theory and that in some well-known environments, they are equivalent. A useful by-product is a decomposition of implementation procedure into two steps: the first is to identify an opportunity system supporting a rule, and the second is to use this system to design a game form implementing the rule. Thus, informational efficiency in the opportunity system, if any, can be embedded in the game form implementing the rule.

키워드

opportunity system opportunity equilibrium Nash implementation monotonicity