Labor-Management Bargaining, Labor Standards and International Rivalry

• 영문명: Labor-Management Bargaining, Labor Standards and International Rivalry
• 발행기관: 한국계량경제학회
• 저자명: Jung Hur Laixun Zhao
• 간행물 정보: 『한국계량경제학회 학술대회 논문집』2008년 하계학술대회, 1~28쪽, 전체 28쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 경제학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2008.08.30

영문 초록

Using the labor union‟s bargaining power as an indication of government policy on labor standards issues, we analyze the competition between a domestic (North) firm and a foreign (South) firm, and their relationship with optimal labor standards (LS). First, we show that the optimal level of LS is higher when labor unions are employment-oriented than when they are not. Second, it is higher under free trade than under the optimal tariff system if labor unions are employment-oriented. Third, „a race to the bottom‟ of LS occurs in the case of wage-oriented unions. Fourth, the North‟s imposing a tariff to force the Southern government to raise its LS is effective only if the Southern union is wage-oriented. In order to raise Southern LS, both countries may need some deeper form of economic integration, if the North does not want to abandon its free trade system.

목차

1. Introduction

2. The Basic Model Setup

3. Comparative Static Analysis

4. Optimal LS and Tariff

5. Some Extensions

6. Concluding Remarks

키워드

Labor-Management Bargaining Labor Standards Labor Union Oligopoly Tariff Economic Integration