Completing Contracts in the Shadow of Costly Verification

• 영문명: Completing Contracts in the Shadow of Costly Verification
• 발행기관: 한국계량경제학회
• 저자명: Albert Choi George Triantis
• 간행물 정보: 『한국계량경제학회 학술대회 논문집』2007년 하계학술대회, 1~23쪽, 전체 23쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 경제학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2007.08.30

영문 초록

Contract theory typically holds that verification costs are obstacles to complete contracting; yet, real world contracts often contain provisions that seem costly to verify. We show how a costly signal can play an important role in contracts. Verification (or litigation) costs operate as a screen on the promisee’s incentive to sue and as a sanction against the breaching party. So long as the court’s judgment is correlated with the realized state of the world, therefore, the parties can design a set of prices (including damages) so as to provide additional incentive to the promisor through an off-theequilibrium, credible litigation threat. We show that contract parties may prefer to adopt a costly signal over a costless signal. Rather than focusing solely on either the problems of adjudication or those of contracting (without sufficient regard to how the disputes will be resolved in the future), we have attempted to take a more comprehensive approach by looking at the design of contracts in anticipation of the path of the adjudication process.

목차

I. Introduction

II. Related Scholarship

III. The Screening and Deterrence Functions of Verification Costs

IV. Verification Costs and Settlement

V. Conclusion