국가예산과정에서의 도덕적 해이(Moral Hazard)에 관한 연구

• 영문명: A Study of Moral Hazard in the Process of Budgeting
• 발행기관: 한국부패학회
• 저자명: 오필환(Oh Phil Hwan)
• 간행물 정보: 『한국부패학회보』제10권 제4호, 83~107쪽, 전체 25쪽
• 주제분류: 법학 > 민법
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2005.12.30

영문 초록

Moral hazard is the main theme of principal-agent model in economics of organization. It refers to the lack of effort on the part of the agent. On other word, the egent is shirking. In the situation where the principal cannot observe the agent's action or preference in full detail there will be asymmetric information between principal and agent. The asymmetric information will induce the agent problen: moral hazard and adverse selection. Moral hazard arises from the unobservability of actual behavior in the ex-post contracting situation. To approach moral hazard rather than corruption is to prevent it in advance. Moral hazard could be occured in public sector more often, especially in the process of budgeting because of the political process and the interests of politicians. Moral hazard in budgeting process can be reduced through the open information system and participation of civil society in the process. Moral hazard could corrupt our society with the bribery and illegal abuse of power for self-interests.

목차

Abstract

1. 서론

2. 부패문제에 대한 도덕적 해이 개념적 접근

3. 부패와 도덕적 해이 사례분석

4. 도덕적 해이의 원인과 대처방안

5. 결언

참고문헌

키워드

Moral Hazard Principal-agent model Corruption