Lawyer's Incentive Contract in Arbitration : A Signaling Approach

• 발행기관: 한국중재학회
• 저자명: Joon Yeop Kwon Sung Ryong Kim
• 간행물 정보: 『중재연구』제34권 제3호, 127~142쪽, 전체 16쪽
• 주제분류: 사회과학 > 무역학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2024.09.30

국문 초록

This study suggests a signaling game model between the claimant and the lawyer. To convince the lawyer’s ability to the claimant, the lawyer has incentive to send a credible signal to the lawyer. We adopt the lawyer’s public relations as a signaling device. Taking advantage of lower marginal cost on public relations, the high type lawyer can separate himself from the low type one. We derive perfect Bayesian equilibria of the signaling game and refine them with a unique equilibrium by invoking Intuitive Criterion of Cho and Kreps(1987). Then we characterize the refined equilibrium.

목차

Ⅰ. Introduction

Ⅱ. Background

Ⅲ. Model

Ⅳ. Perfect Bayesian Equilibria

Ⅴ. Comparative Statics

Ⅵ. Conclusion

References

키워드

arbitration lawyer signaling game reputation retaining fee