Collection of Personal Data with Information Externality in Two-Sided Markets

• 발행기관: 한국계량경제학회
• 저자명: Hyungjin Kim Jinhyuk Lee
• 간행물 정보: 『JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY AND ECONOMETRICS』Vol.31 No.3, 1~22쪽, 전체 22쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 경제학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2020.09.30

영문 초록

We study the conditions under which an internet platform excessivelycollects personal information when information externality exists. A monopolisticplatform runs two-sided business where users and firms form eachside. Users do not pay fees to the platform, but firms pay for targeted advertisements.In an environment where marginal information externality is large, theamount of personal information collected exceeds social optimum i) when theutility of marginal user does not make up for the aggregate disutility of existingusers and firms and ii) when the platform extracts large markup from firms tokeep users.

목차

1. INTRODUCTION

2. LITERATURE REVIEW

3. MODEL STRUCTURE

4. DISCUSSION

REFERENCES

키워드

Privacy Personal Information Private Information Information Externality Two-Sided Market