Contests with Linear Externality in Prizes

• 발행기관: 서울대학교 경제연구소
• 저자명: Sung-Hoon Park Sanghack Lee
• 간행물 정보: 『Seoul Journal of Economics』Seoul Journal of Economics Volume 32 No.3, 323~336쪽, 전체 14쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 경제학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2019.08.30

영문 초록

This study examines contests in which prizes are affected linearly by aggregate effort. In particular, this research analyzes a contest among individuals as a benchmark to scrutinize the effects of prize externality and sharing-rule information on rent-dissipation rate and social welfare. Thereafter, the current study investigates two types of group contest with linear prize externality: one with private information on intra-group sharing rules and the other with public information on intra-group sharing rules. Results indicate as follows. (1) An increase in prize externality increases rent-dissipation rate but has no effect on social welfare. (2) The group contest with private information on sharing rules yields higher social welfare and lower rent-dissipation rate than the one with public information on sharing rules.

키워드

Group contest Linear externality in prize Intra-group sharing rule Private information on sharing rules Public information on sharing rules