정부조직 형태의 차이와 로비하의 관세: 서구 국가와 중국을 중심으로

• 영문명: Difference in Government Organization and Tariffs under Lobbying
• 발행기관: 한국무역연구원
• 저자명: 이종민(Jongmin Lee)
• 간행물 정보: 『무역연구』제14권 제4호, 219~237쪽, 전체 19쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 무역학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2018.08.23

영문 초록

This study analyzes how the form of government organization in terms of political economy affects the political tariffs caused by lobbying and how large the gap is. Realistically, even if the Chinese economy has become considerably market-oriented since joining the WTO, the level of protection tariffs determined by political processes will be essentially different from that of Western democracies because the political system is different. We find that the amount of political tariffs is relatively higher in a central party-state government organization than in a democratic government organization. This is because, in the latter type of government, the decision-making process of trade policy is more uncertain in terms of transparency and predictability than in the democratic government system. It also is shown that political tariff under the two political systems will be the same when the centralized system becomes a democratic one. This suggests that the more democratic the centralized system becomes, the more the liberalization of trade can be promoted.

목차

Ⅰ. 서론

Ⅱ. 정부조직의 형태와 무역정책의 결정과정

Ⅲ. 기본모형과 벤치마크

Ⅳ. 민주주의 국가체제에서의 정치적 관세

Ⅴ. 중앙당 국가체제에서의 정치적 관세: 중국정부의 형태를 중심으로

Ⅵ. 결론

키워드

Lobby Optimal Tariff Political Tariff