대기업과 중소기업 간의 신뢰 게임

• 영문명: Trust Game between a Small and Medium-sized Enterprise and a Big Business
• 발행기관: 한국윤리경영학회
• 저자명: 김정유(Jeong Yoo Kim) 최경규(Gyoung Gyu Choi)
• 간행물 정보: 『한국윤리경영학회 학술대회 발표논문집』2016년 춘계학술대회 발표논문집, 86~99쪽, 전체 14쪽
• 주제분류: 경제경영 > 경영학
• 파일형태: PDF
• 발행일자: 2016.04.22

영문 초록

We consider an extended trust game between a small and medium-sized enterprise (SME) and a big business (BB) with unobservable investment. The game has two Nash equilibria: the trust outcome and no trust outcome. By revoking the forward induction argument, we show that the trustee (BB) who has the option of burning money can single out the trust outcome. Burning money can be interpreted as a payment for nothing by BB in advance. Furthermore, by allowing cheap talk such as verbal assurance by BB to SME instead of burning money and using the refinement of neologism-proofness, we show that a more efficient outcome can be attainable.

목차

Abstract

Ⅰ. Introduction

Ⅱ. Extended Trust Game

Ⅲ. Extended Trust Game with Burning Money

Ⅳ. Extended Trust Game with Cheap Talk

Ⅴ. Conclusion

References

키워드

Burning Money Cheap Talk Forward Induction Neologism- Proofness Trust Game